Background: Psychological distress is common among patients with cancer, with severe consequences on their quality of life. Anxiety and depression are the most common clinical presentation of psychological distress in cancer patients, but in some cases cancer may represent a traumatic event resulting in posttraumatic stress disorder. Currently, Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy is considered an evidence-based treatment for PTSD, but recent studies also showed its effectiveness for anxiety and depression. The aim of the present systematic review is to (...) summarize the current literature on the effect of EMDR on cancer-related psychological distress.Methods: A literature search was conducted for peer-reviewed articles about “EMDR” and “cancer patients” in the following electronic databases: PubMed, MEDLINE, Science Direct, Google Scholar, and Cochrane library.Results: Our search identified 7 studies in which EMDR was used with a total of 140 cancer patients. The psychiatric diagnosis was PTSD in 3 studies. Otherwise, the diagnosis concerned the anxious and depressive disorder spectrum. Overall, EMDR treatment schedules used were highly heterogeneous, with a different number of sessions and a different duration of therapy. However, across all studies analyzed EMDR therapy was judged to be adequate in reducing symptoms of psychological distress in this population.Conclusions: According to the results of our analysis, the level of evidence regarding EMDR efficacy in cancer patients is limited by the scarcity of studies and their low methodological quality. Although better quality research is needed, available data suggest that EMDR could be a promising treatment for psychological distress in patients with cancer. (shrink)

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return (...) of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

Should decision-making algorithms be held to higher standards of transparency than human beings? The way we answer this question directly impacts what we demand from explainable algorithms, how we govern them via regulatory proposals, and how explainable algorithms may help resolve the social problems associated with decision making supported by artificial intelligence. Some argue that algorithms and humans should be held to the same standards of transparency and that a double standard of transparency is hardly justified. We give two arguments (...) to the contrary and specify two kinds of situations for which higher standards of transparency are required from algorithmic decisions as compared to humans. Our arguments have direct implications on the demands from explainable algorithms in decision-making contexts such as automated transportation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 1 Seiten: 146-164.

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

Let M be an o-minimal expansion of a real closed field. Let G be a definably compact definably connected abelian n-dimensional group definable in M. We show the following: the o-minimal fundamental group of G is isomorphic to ℤn; for each k>0, the k-torsion subgroup of G is isomorphic to n, and the o-minimal cohomology algebra over ℚ of G is isomorphic to the exterior algebra over ℚ with n generators of degree one.

Es wird gezeigt, daß in der Skizze zum Beweis des 2. Satzes von Gödel dieser eine stillschweigende Voraussetzung macht, die im Widerspruch zu den üblichen Forderungen nach Eindeutigkeit der benutzten Terme steht: Eine und dieselbe Gödelzahl g repräsentiert nämlich einmal den Ausdruck g1: "ein im System k unentscheidbarer Satz" und das andere Mal den Ausdruck g2: "g1 ist in k nicht beweisbar". Beachtet man aber diesen Unterschied, so ist der Widerspruch nicht herleitbar, auf dem der Gödelsche Beweis basiert.

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

Let R be an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group R has no poles, R cannot define a real closed field with domain R and order R is eventually linear and every R -definable set is a finite union of cones. As a corollary we get that Th has quantifier elimination and universal axiomatization in the language with symbols for the ordered group operations, bounded R -definable sets and a symbol for each definable endomorphism of the group.

We argue that the asymmetry between diverging and converging electromagnetic waves is just one of many asymmetries in observed phenomena that can be explained by a past hypothesis and statistical postulate (together assigning probabilities to different states of matter and field in the early universe). The arrow of electromagnetic radiation is thus absorbed into a broader account of temporal asymmetries in nature. We give an accessible introduction to the problem of explaining the arrow of radiation and compare our preferred strategy (...) for explaining the arrow to three alternatives: (i) modifying the laws of electromagnetism by adding a radiation condition requiring that electromagnetic fields always be attributable to past sources, (ii) removing electromagnetic fields and having particles interact directly with one another through retarded action-at-a-distance, (iii) adopting the Wheeler-Feynman approach and having particles interact directly through half-retarded half-advanced action-at-a-distance. In addition to the asymmetry between diverging and converging waves, we also consider the related asymmetry of radiation reaction. (shrink)

There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan’s meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true, while present best theories are demonstrably (...) completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. (shrink)

Philosophy is sometimes perceived as an abstract and nerdy discipline dealing with problems of its own creation in an isolated chamber of the Ivory Tower. And there is some truth to this view. But philosophy can help us deal with common problems, such as the disagreements we have in our everyday lives.

Background The perception of organ donation and brain death among Syrian population has not been previously explored. The goal of this study is to evaluate the attitude and knowledge of organ donation among Syrians and the willingness of this population to donate their organs. Methods We conducted a survey-based cross-sectional study in four hospitals in Aleppo, Syria in November 2019. Patient demographic, awareness of brain death; and attitude toward organ donation were collected and analyzed. Results A total of 350 individuals (...) were invited to participate in the survey among whom 303 agreed to participate in the study. The majority of our participants heard about organ donation with television, social media, and the internet being the most common sources of information. When assessing knowledge about brain death, only 40% answered 3 or more questions correctly. Fifty-eight percent of respondents agreed with the idea of organ donation and 183 would like to donate their organs one day. The leading motivation to organ donation was the desire to help, while the most common reason to refuse donation was the refusal to disfigure a dead body by removing an organ. Religious reasons were cited as motivation for organ donation by 43% of participants, and a reason for refusing to donate organs by 24%. Most respondents were unaware of the laws and legislations related to organ donation in Syria. When asked if religion and law were encouraging organ donation, 76% of respondents would donate their organs. Although more positive attitude was found in those with better brain death knowledge, this did not translate into more willingness to donate organs in this group of participants. Conclusions The promotion of organ donations from deceased donors is a necessity given the rising shortage of organs. The information provided by this study could help policy makers build future strategies to promote deceased organ donation programs and overcome current obstacles preventing such initiatives from achieving their goals. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish whether the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics as applied to business organizations are meaningful in a non-western business context. It does so by building on research reported in Moore : 363–387, 2012) in which the application of virtue ethics to business organizations was investigated empirically in the UK, based on a conceptual framework drawn from MacIntyre’s work. Comparing these results with an equivalent study in Sri Lanka, the paper finds that the categories are meaningful but (...) that there are both similarities to and considerable differences in the content of these categories from the UK study. The paper draws on aspects of institutional theory to explore and explain these findings. Overall, there is supportive evidence that the categories of MacIntyrean virtue ethics are generalizable, and so can be used to characterize problems of organizational virtue and vice around the world, while providing evidence that there may be polities which are more conducive to the ‘practice-like conduct of production’ : 77–91, 2008). (shrink)

The contrast between the past-future symmetry of mechanical theories and the time-arrow observed in the behaviour of real complex systems doesn’t have nowadays a fully satisfactory explanation. If one confides in the Laplace-dream that everything be exactly and completely describable by the known mechanical differential equations, the whole experimental evidence of the irreversibility of real complex processes can only be interpreted as an illusion due to the limits of human brain and shortness of human history. In this work it is (...) surmised that in the description of real events it would be more reasonable to renounce exactness and completeness of mechanical differential equations, assuming that also further effects exist in nature, governed by different kinds of rules, in spite of being so weak to be directly unobservable in single motions. This surmise can explain not only the time-arrow, but also why, in particular cases, it can happen that approximate and/or statistical models represent an improvement of mechanical theories instead of an approximation: this happened for Boltzmann gas-model and also for the famous work of Max Planck on blackbody-radiation. And it also appears as a more promising “working hypothesis”, stimulating and guiding us to learn more about limits and origin of the basic equations, and also about the nature of chance and the meaning of probability, which is nowadays not clear in spite of the fundamental role it plays in physics. Particularly that kind of probability which gives the connection between quantum–mechanical differential equations and observable events. (shrink)

Suppose G is a definably connected, definable group in an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group. We show that the o-minimal universal covering homomorphism equation image: equation image→ G is a locally definable covering homomorphism and π1 is isomorphic to the o-minimal fundamental group π of G defined using locally definable covering homomorphisms.

We present strategies how to reconstruct (estimate) properties of a quantum channel described by the map E based on incomplete measurements. In a particular case of a qubit channel a complete reconstruction of the map E can be performed via complete tomography of four output states E[ρj] that originate from a set of four linearly independent “test” states ρj (j = 1,2,3,4) at the input of the channel. We study the situation when less than four linearly independent states are transmitted (...) via the channel and measured at the output. We present strategies how to reconstruct the channel when just one, two or three states are transmitted via the channel. In particular, we show that if just one state is transmitted via the channel then the best reconstruction can be achieved when this state is a total mixture described by the density operator ρ = I/2. To improve the reconstruction procedure one has to send via the channel more states. The best strategy is to complement the total mixture with pure states that are mutually orthogonal in the sense of the Bloch-sphere representation. We show that unitary transformations (channels) can be uniquely reconstructed (determined) based on the information of how three properly chosen input states are transformed under the action of the channel. (shrink)

Deployment Realism resists Laudan’s and Lyons’ objections to the “No Miracle Argument” by arguing that a hypothesis is most probably true when it is deployed essentially in a novel prediction. However, Lyons criticized Psillos’ criterion of essentiality, maintaining that Deployment Realism should be committed to all the actually deployed assumptions. But since many actually deployed assumptions proved false, he concludes that the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism fail. I reply that the essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor. In (...) fact, there is a simpler formulation of essentiality which escapes Lyons’ criticisms and rescues the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism from their purported historical counterexamples: a hypothesis is essential when it has no proper parts (in Yablo’s sense) sufficient to derive the same prediction. Although essentiality so conceived cannot be detected prospectively, this is just natural, and it is not a problem but an advantage for Deployment Realism. (shrink)

Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's normative naturalism does neither rest (...) on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency. (shrink)

We show that if G is a definably compact, definably connected definable group defined in an arbitrary o-minimal structure, then G is divisible. Furthermore, if G is defined in an o-minimal expansion of a field, k ∈ ℕ and pk : G → G is the definable map given by pk = xk for all x ∈ G , then we have |–1| ≥ kr for all x ∈ G , where r > 0 is the maximal dimension of abelian (...) definable subgroups of G. (shrink)